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Now I Know My “ACBs”: The Right to
Literacy Following an Incremental Path
Gregory J. O’Neill
15 U. MASS. L. REV. 292
ABSTRACT
It is a tragic irony that a nation with enormous wealth will not provide the most basic
of education rights to its citizens. Despite continual judicial and legislative measures
to ensure access to education, or a facsimile thereof, no judicial or legislative body
has taken the step to ensure that literacy is a fundamental right for the citizens of the
United States. The issue has been, and continues to be, presented to both Congress
and the courts. While Congress has passed legislation to some degree, both
institutions have largely failed to ensure the population receives the fundamental
right of literacy.
There is not much pushback to the argument that education and literacy are
important. But questions remain: How much education is necessary to claim that
literacy is a right? Is literacy important enough to shine brightly on the national
consciousness?
AUTHOR’S NOTE
B.A. Amherst College; J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Massachusetts School of
Law. The author owes a great deal to Professors Jeremiah Ho and Frances Rudko for
their feedback and guidance; without which, this paper would still be a fledgling
idea, spinning around in his head. The author would like to acknowledge Mary Brigh
Lavery and the entire UMass Law Review team for their tireless work. The author
thanks his friends and family, especially Jeni, whose support gave him the fortitude
to take on the challenge of law school, at this point in his life. Finally, the author
would be remiss if he did not mention his partner in crime, the lawyer-dog, Harley.
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LITERACY IS FUNDAMENTAL
Literacy is a fundamental requirement for the exercise of effective
citizenship and the foundational building-blocks of a democratic
society, yet it is not a right. How can this be? More importantly, how
can it become one? “[B]asic literacy, is essential for a well-functioning
democracy, and enhances citizenship and community.”1 Conversely, a
lack of literacy has a negative impact on community and societal
stability. “Illiteracy is perhaps the strongest common denominator
among individuals in corrections.”2 Rates of literacy and education are
directly correlated to crime, public assistance, and “higher payback in
the form of sales, property, and state income taxes.”3 Education levels
also have a “strong and significant” effect on health.4
Studies demonstrate that illiteracy negatively impacts academic,
personal, and professional achievement, as well as mental health and
social/emotional well-being. A child who is not reading proficiently in
third grade is four times more likely to fail to graduate from high
school on time.5 As for the students who do graduate from high school
with poor literacy skills, they are unprepared and ill-equipped to enter
the workforce.6
This Note will argue that a right to literacy is a fundamental
requirement for a citizenry to meaningfully exercise their rights.
Additionally, it will be posited that since the federal system is
disinclined to promote the right to literacy, an appropriate path may be
through the lens of the theory of incrementalism. By following similar
issues that gained national prominence after starting as a hodgepodge
of state laws, this Note will argue that it is possible to thrust literacy
1

2

3

4

5

6

Claudia Goldin, A Brief History of Education in the United States 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Historical Working Paper No. 119, 1999).
William Drakeford, The Impact of an Intensive Program to Increase the
Literacy Skills of Youth Confined to Juvenile Corrections, 53 J. CORRECTIONAL
EDUC. 139, 139 (2002).
Michael Hout, Social and Economic Returns to College Education in the United
States, 38 ANN. REV. SOC. 379, 392 (2012).
Adriana Lleras-Muney, The Relationship Between Education and Adult
Mortality in the United States, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 189, 189 (2005).
DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: HOW THIRD-GRADE READING
SKILLS AND POVERTY INFLUENCE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION 3 (2011),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED518818.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW7C-K2TQ].
See generally Bob Wise, High Schools at the Tipping Point, EDUC. LEADERSHIP,
May 2008, at 8.
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onto the national stage to ensure equitable enforcement and, some may
argue, moral equality.
Part I focuses on the history of education and literacy through a
judicial and social lens. Part I also analyzes the crucial role that
literacy plays in the preservation and fulfillment of other constitutional
rights. Part II evaluates the theory of incrementalism, both its
background and how it has applied to previous issues. Part III
concludes with an analysis of how incrementalism could promulgate
literacy, as a fundamental right, into the national consciousness.
I. THE HISTORY OF LITERACY & ITS IMPORTANCE
A. History
In 1642, Massachusetts Bay Colony passed the first law, in what
would eventually become the United States, which required that
children be taught to read and write.7 The English Puritans who
founded Massachusetts believed that the well-being of individuals,
along with the success of the colony, depended on a literate citizenry
to read both the Bible and the laws of the land that governed them.8
Many of the founding fathers regarded education and literacy as
essential foundations to a healthy democracy. Thomas Jefferson
regarded the freedom of the press as important, but not enough, on its
own, to guarantee a healthy democracy.9 In 1816, Jefferson wrote to
Charles Yancey, a prominent Virginia legislator, “[w]here the press is
free, and every man is able to read, all is safe.”10 John Adams, too,
saw the need for a quality education and—sixty-seven years before the
first law mandating compulsory education in the United States—he
argued in favor of a system of publicly funded education:
[T]he Whole People must take upon themselvs the Education of
the Whole People and must be willing to bear the expences of it.
7

8

9

10

See William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35
B.C. L. REV. 569, 570 (1994).
Id. “For example, the Massachusetts School Law of 1642, empowered town
officials to hold all parents and masters accountable for their children’s ability
‘to read and understand the principles of religion and the capitall lawes [sic] of
this country’ by imposing ‘fines upon such as shall refuse to render such
accounts.’” Id. (quoting 1 EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 393 (Sol Cohen ed. 1974)).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816), in 11
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 493, 497 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
Id. (emphasis added).
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[T]here should not be a district of one Mile Square without a
school in it, not founded by a Charitable individual but maintained
at the expence of the People themselvs they must be taught to
reverence themselvs instead of adoreing their servants their
Generals Admirals Bishops and Statesmen [sic].11

Additionally, the relationship between education and the peoples’
freedom to exercise political will was readily understood as crucial; as
James Madison explained: “a people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives.”12
More recently, in 1965, with the passage of President Johnson’s
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and its more well-known
reauthorizations in 2001 and 2015, the federal government fully
entrenched itself in the education of the nation’s children.13 However
well-intentioned and effective these policies may be,14 a simple truth
remains. None of these Acts of Congress have given the American
people a right to literacy.

11

12

13

14

Letter from John Adams to John Jebb (Sept. 10, 1785),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-17-02-0232
[https://perma.cc/936B-DAPT].
THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., The
Easton Press 1988).
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (“ESEA”), Pub. L. No. 89-10,
79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). This Act
provided federal funding to elementary and secondary education with particular
emphasis on equal access to education, closing achievement gaps, and
supporting impoverished children. Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal
Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1309,
1317–21 (2017) [hereinafter Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education].
Additionally, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”) reauthorized
ESEA and furthered federal control in public education by conditioning funding
on testing, progress reports, and teacher qualifications. See Derek W. Black, The
Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 343–52 (2010). The Every
Student Succeeds Act of 2015 (“ESSA”) replaced NCLB’s strict assessment
protocols while reauthorizing ESEA’s federal role in public education. Black,
Abandoning the Federal Role in Education at 1311–12. ESSA retained the
standardized testing requirement but returned the power to determine the
academic standards of the tests to the states. Id.
An analysis of ESEA, NCLB, and ESSA’s effectiveness has been well debated
and better left for another time. Notably, the teeth of the Acts—their
accountability regulations—were knocked out in 2017. Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, H.R.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2017).
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The Supreme Court has considered the education issue in some
form or another, but it too has not found a constitutional right to
literacy, or education for that matter.15 The seminal education decision
in the nation’s history came in Brown v. Board of Education.16 The
Brown Court mandated equal access to education and the end to the
evil of segregation.17 While declaring education as “perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments” and of great
“importance . . . to our democratic society,” the Court stopped short of
mandating education or holding that literacy was a right.18 The belief
in the importance of education that underlies the holding in Brown has
surfaced in other cases, but those cases have limited their decision to
the scope of unconstitutional restrictions on access to education.19
Other cases at the federal level have also failed to build upon the,
albeit indirect, success of Brown, Plyler, and Davis in attempting to
establish a right to education and/or literacy.20
The Supreme Court has, in the past, been willing to recognize
some affirmative rights, but a recent swing towards judicial restraint

15

16

17
18
19

20

See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–35 (1973)
(refusing to apply strict scrutiny where the system of school financing resulted
in disproportionate expenses for children hailing from different districts).
347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, plaintiffs sought admission to the public schools
of their respective communities. Id. at 487. Each were denied entry to schools
that white children were allowed to attend. Id. at 488. They sought protection
from discriminatory segregation under the protections afforded them by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 493.
See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (holding that
school boards may be liable to Title IX claims if pervasive harassment of
students effectively bars their access to education); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
230 (1982) (holding that children of illegal immigrants are entitled to access to
education).
See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 460 (1988) (rejecting the
Plyler standard of heightened review); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285–86
(1986) (comparing the holdings in Plyler and Rodriguez and concluding that
without the designation of education as a fundamental right, the rational basis
test would be used). See generally Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 368
(E.D. Mich. 2018) (applying the rational basis test); Foster v. Tupelo Pub. Sch.
Dist., 569 F. Supp. 2d 667, 674 (N.D. Miss. 2008) (applying the rational basis
test).
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has crippled its ability to cure the nation’s ills.21 The Court has, on
several occasions, though often only in dicta or dissent, espoused the
notion that education is a crucial element to the civic and economic
health of the nation.22 However, coupled with the historic precedent of
relegating educational policy to the states, the refusal to recognize a
right to education or literacy, and the modern Court’s trend towards
judicial restraint, it is unlikely that much or any headway can be made
at the federal level to realize this right.
Even if every state had the hypothetical duty to provide a
Rodriguez-ian basic quantum of education,23 it would be a patchwork
of disparate standards and uneven enforcement. As it stands, every
state does have its own individual constitutional mandate, which—at a
minimum—sets forth a system to provide a free public education.24
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights goes well beyond simply
establishing a public education system and sets out a broad and wideranging mandate for education in the Commonwealth:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally
among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation
of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the
opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of
the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall
be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of
this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the
21

22

23

24

See Ian Millhiser, What Happens to a Dream Deferred?: Cleansing the Taint of
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 55 DUKE L.J. 405, 407
(2005).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 620, 629 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(Education is “inextricably intertwined with the Nation’s economy . . . . These
expenditures enable schools to provide a valuable service—namely, to equip
students with the skills they need to survive in life and, more specifically, in the
workplace.”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (“The importance of
public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been
recognized by our decisions . . . .”); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (“[Education] is
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.”).
The Supreme Court did not “foreclose the possibility ‘that some identifiable
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or the right to vote].’” Papasan,
478 U.S. at 284 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 36 (1973)).
To view each state’s educational mandates, see Education - State Laws, LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_education
[https://perma.cc/8HUV-FXWX].
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sciences, and all seminaries of them; . . . to countenance and
inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence,
public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and
punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social
affections, and generous sentiments among the people.25

This clause has been interpreted by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court to mean that the Commonwealth has a duty to provide
its citizens with more than mere access to an education; it must furnish
them with an “adequate” level of education in the pursuit of an
enlightened and just citizenry.26 Other states’ constitutions are far less
prescriptive in their imposition of a duty to provide an equitable,
adequate, and accountable education to their citizens.27 Massachusetts
25
26

27

MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2.
Doe v. Sec’y of Educ., 95 N.E.3d 241, 253 (Mass. 2018). Education is a means
to the following ends:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems to enable students to make informed choices; (iii)
sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community,
state, and nation . . . .
Id. at 253 n.23 (quoting McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993)).
Legal scholar William E. Thro uses a system of categorization to identify the
disparate duties of states’ educational obligations in their constitutions. William
E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions
in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1661–68
(1989). While Thro’s analysis was done in the light of financial obligations
owed by the states, it is applicable to this discussion as well: “Category I
education clauses provide for a system of free public schools and nothing
more . . . .” Id. at 1662 (footnote omitted). “Category II education clauses . . .
mandate . . . a certain minimum standard of quality . . . .” Id. at 1663 (footnote
omitted). “Category III education clauses [provide] . . . ‘stronger and more
specific education mandate[s]’ and ‘purposive preambles.’” Id. at 1668
(footnotes omitted). “Category IV clauses impose the greatest obligation . . . .
Typically, they provide that education is ‘fundamental,’ ‘primary,’ or
‘paramount.’” Id. at 1667–68 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 11,
§ 1 (as a Category I clause: “The legislature shall provide for the maintenance
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this
state may be educated.”). It is worth noting that the New York Assembly has
pending legislation that would propel this provision to a Category II: “The
legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free and
quality education from prekindergarten through the undergraduate degrees or
certification programs offered in post secondary schools, wherein all pupils of
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has been the legal “tip of the spear” on many social issues. In an
August 28th statement, Senator Edward Markey described
Massachusetts as being “at the forefront of the challenges of our time
— universal health care [and] same sex marriage . . . .”28 Why then
should a right to literacy not begin at the state level, where the first
educational laws were passed? Historically, it has been at the state
level where other social norms have bloomed from state-based policy
into a national discourse—why should a right to literacy not take this
same path?
B. Literacy and Freedom of Expression
The First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”29 It “rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free
press is a condition of a free society.”30 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly reaffirmed the need for unfettered access to manifestations
of “press.”31 These rights regarding unfettered distribution of
information, however, are only one side of the story.32 There must be
someone on the other side to receive the information, because there
can be no true exchange without mutual give and take.33

28

29
30
31

32

33

this state may be educated.” 2019 N.Y. Assemb. B. No. 8738, 242d Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2019) (emphasis added).
Chris Lisinski, As Kennedy Considers Run, Markey Touts Endorsements of 116
Lawmakers, TAUNTON DAILY GAZETTE (Aug. 27, 2019, 6:20 PM),
https://www.tauntongazette.com/news/20190827/as-kennedy-considers-runmarkey-touts-endorsements-of-116-lawmakers [https://perma.cc/Z2HJ-AD4A]
(last updated Aug 28, 2019, 11:34 AM).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
See Virgina State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 755–57 (1976) (discussing the right to receive commercial
advertising); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305–07 (1965)
(discussing the right to receive foreign political publications).
See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763–64 (1972). “It is now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas. ‘This freedom (of speech and press) . . . necessarily protects the right to
receive.’” Id. at 762–63 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (“Freedom of speech
presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here,
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In order to have a true and meaningful exercise of speech and
press, the exchange of information must be received by a populous that
can interpret, decipher, and understand the information it is
receiving.34
Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First
Amendment rights, both as a source and as a receiver of
information and ideas, whatever interests he may pursue in
life . . . . The opportunity for formal education . . . . may enhance
the individual’s enjoyment of those rights . . . . Thus . . . “the
pivotal position of education to success in American society and its
essential role in opening up to the individual the central
experiences of our culture lend it an importance that is
undeniable.”35

A people denied an affirmative right to literacy are curtailed from
freely and fully exercising their First Amendment rights and will be
stunted in their ability to participate in our democratic society.36
C. Literacy and the Right to Exercise Political Will
There can be no question that there is “a constitutionally protected
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in
the jurisdiction.”37 That “right to vote in federal elections is conferred
by Art. I, s 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution, and
access to the state franchise has been afforded special protection
because it is ‘preservative of other basic civil and political rights.’”38

34

35

36

37
38

the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its
recipients both.”).
UNESCO, THE PLURALITY OF LITERACY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICIES
AND PROGRAMMES 13 (2004), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001362/
136246e.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEE4-4QM3].
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 112–13 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Note, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1129 (1969)).
See generally Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 47 (2004). In his discussion of the evolution of free speech in the digital
age, Balkin addresses the importance of participating in a democracy, through
“interactivity, mass participation, and the ability to modify and transform
culture.” Id. at 1. He points to education as one of the ways in which a
democracy “promote[s] free speech values.” Id. at 47.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
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In order to have meaningful participation in the political process,
access to the participation must be free from prohibitive barriers.39
Illiteracy can bar meaningful participation in the political process
in two ways. First, ballots are written documents that must be read—a
person who cannot read or understand the ballot cannot meaningfully
participate in the political process.40 Second, just as illiteracy hampers
engagement in First Amendment expression, so too does it bar “the
free discussion of governmental affairs.”41 In order to have meaningful
participation in the political process, “voters must be free to obtain
information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast
their votes.”42 For these reasons, it is essential that voters are equipped
to make an intelligent decision in the ballot box.43
D. Opposition to Literacy as a Right
Historically, education has been a function of the state and the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to expand the reach of the federal
government into local matters.44 “[T]he ultimate solutions must come
from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who
elect them.”45 Those who oppose the idea of literacy as a fundamental
right generally also oppose the idea of judicially-created rights and the
recognition of positive rights outside of those enumerated in the
Constitution.46
39

40

41
42
43
44

45
46

See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 572 U.S. 291, 368 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36 (“[A] voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently
unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately
developed.”).
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 113–14. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979). “Today, education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments.” Id. (quoting Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741
(1974) (“No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools . . . .”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 564 (1995) (stating that education is an area where states have historically
been sovereign).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59.
See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–
96 (1989) (declining to hold that the Due Process Clause grants an affirmative
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This federalist argument for a more restricted role of the federal
judiciary is as old as the country itself.47 It contends that judges are not
the best vehicle for implementing social change, especially in regards
to something as intricate and state/municipality-specific as education
and literacy.48 “The central insight of Rodriguez is that ‘the Justices of
this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to
the raising and disposition of public revenues.’”49 This line of thought
additionally discourages the Court against interceding into political
theater by creating policy.50 “The greatest threat to judicial
independence occurs when the courts flout the basis for their
independence by exceeding their constitutionally limited role and the
bounds of their expertise by engaging in policymaking committed to
the elected branches or the states.”51 When taken in the context of this
Note, the Constitution does not provide for a positive right to either
education or literacy.52 “Not even the broadest reading of the due

47
48

49
50
51

52

right to governmental aid); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980)
(“Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection
against unwarranted government interference . . . it does not confer an
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of
that freedom.”); Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 364 (E.D. Mich. 2018)
(“Even when the Supreme Court has ventured to recognize a right as
fundamental, it has typically limited them to ‘negative rights’ . . . .”). See also
John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J.
1219, 1221 (1993) (arguing that a disciplined approach to standing is one
example of “judicial self-restraint”).
See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Greg Weiner, Literacy Is a Good, Not a Right, LAW & LIBERTY (July 11, 2018),
https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/07/11/literacy-is-a-good-not-a-right/
[https://perma.cc/7KDJ-E43Z].
Millhiser, supra note 21, at 407 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41).
Weiner, supra note 48.
John G. Roberts, Jr., Draft Article on Judicial Restraint 3 (undated) (on file with
the National Archives and Records Administration), https://www.archives.gov/
files/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/doc006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6UZH-MTAV]. “A second means by which courts arrogate to themselves
functions reserved to the legislative branch or the states is through so-called
‘fundamental rights’ and ‘suspect class’ analyses, both of which invite broad
judicial scrutiny of the essentially legislative task of classification.” Id. at 4.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). See Gary B.
v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“The Court is left to
conclude that the Supreme Court has neither confirmed nor denied that access to
literacy is a fundamental right.”). In Gary B., the district court concluded that
the Due Process Clause does not demand a State to affirmatively provide a right
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process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment can
establish a right to literacy . . . . [T]here is no case under the federal
constitution here.”53 Essentially, this policy of judicial restraint boils
down to a basic proposition: just because something is “stupid” does
not mean that it is unconstitutional.54 Inversely, a valid and desirable
social good does not make it a fundamental right.
E. Literacy is Testable, Justiciable, & Remediable
Countering the argument against judicial recognition of a right to
literacy is the important consideration that courts have adequate
measuring and remedying tools at their disposal to decide an issue.
The evolution of the national education system, the introduction of
federal and state testing, and additional mandated standards make it
entirely possible today.55 Without the data that is available today,
plaintiffs had no ability to demonstrate to courts how much education

53
54

55

to literacy. Id. at 366; see also Roberts, supra note 51, at 5 (“When confronting
constitutional problems in the context of the administration of state institutions
[like schools], courts must be particularly cognizant of their lack of
expertise . . . .”).
Weiner, supra note 48.
Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 4, 2013,
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/
[https://perma.cc/4BAW-EXQU]. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). “[T]he law before the Court today ‘is . . .
uncommonly silly.’ If I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to
repeal [the law punishing same sex activity] . . . . Notwithstanding this, I
recognize that as a Member of this Court I am not empowered to help petitioners
and others similarly situated.” Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S.
479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“I do not . . . base my view that this . . . law is constitutional on a
belief that [it] is wise or that its policy is a good one . . . . [T]he law is every bit
as offensive to me as it is my Brethren of the majority . . . .”).
See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat.
1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (requiring statemandated expansion of standardized testing for primary school students); DAVID
P. GARDNER ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT
RISK:
THE
IMPERATIVE
FOR
EDUCATIONAL
REFORM
(1983),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED226006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/764H-ZA2Q]
(advocating for the expansion of standardized testing at the primary and
secondary school levels); History of Standardized Testing in the United States,
NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/66139.htm [https://perma.cc/
H4LU-ZPW2] (describing standardized testing’s now-widespread application)
[hereinafter History of Standardized Testing].
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was required for students to fully exercise constitutional rights.
Similarly, data could not illustrate the level of education required to
effectively participate in the political process, or furthermore, to assess
what schools did or did not do to meet a minimum bar—because that
data was non-existent.
When Rodriguez was decided in 1964, there were little to no
nation-wide assessment tools and (rightfully, or not) the courts would
have been ill-equipped to find a remedy or baseline for a literacy test.56
Today, there are multiple literacy assessment tools which are
supported by pedagogy and utilized nationally. The Flesch-Kincaid
reading assessment was developed in the 1970s by J. Peter Kincaid.57
It is widely used by state and federal agencies to ensure that important
official documents are accessible, via their readability, to their
citizens.58 Additionally, the Lexile Framework is a linguistic-based
assessment that is currently used in every state to measure reading
standards set by the federally initiated ‘Common Core’ requirements.59
Moreover, twenty-five states report Lexile measures on their year-end
assessments.60
The academic literature strongly supports the validity of the
methods used by assessments like Flesch-Kincaid and Lexile.61 Their
use by government agencies and their reliance by educators throughout
the country could provide reliable methods to the courts for assessing
and quantifying what specific levels of literacy are necessary to be
able to understand any given text. With national and state reliance on
standardized testing, courts also have usable and persuasive data to

56
57

58

59

60
61

History of Standardized Testing, supra note 55.
WILLIAM DUBAY, THE PRINCIPLES OF READABILITY 21–22 (2004), https://
files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED490073.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FEK-9J2M].
Kincaid’s reading grade level assessment was designed to measure the gradelevel readability of technical materials for the U.S. Navy. Id.
See, e.g., Readable Language in Insurance Policies, FLA. STAT. § 627.4145(1)(a)
(2003).
States That Use Lexile Measures, LEXILE FRAMEWORK FOR READING,
https://lexile.com/departments-of-education/states-that-use-lexile/
[https://perma.cc/9WQN-9PLS].
Id.
See generally Sheida White & John Clement, Assessing the Lexile Framework:
Results of a Panel Meeting (Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Working Paper No.
2001-08, 2001), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/200108.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U5BG-AZU3].
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determine whether certain students, schools, municipalities, or states
are attaining the appropriate level of literacy.62
II. INCREMENTALISM
A. Background & Theory
The incremental model is a policymaking process attributed to
Yale University political scientist Charles Lindblom. According to
Lindblom, policymakers work through a process of “continually
building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small
degrees.”63 Alternatively, “[d]ecisions thus arrived at are usually only
marginally different from those that exist; in other words, the changes
from the status quo are incremental.”64 Before Lindblom, the
prevailing notion of policymaking featured methodical attempts to
achieve all-encompassing solutions by identifying all relevant
objectives, ranking them, and then coming up with potential
solutions.65 Policymakers would then compare every one of the policy
alternatives, decide which best achieved the goals, and implement the
viable policy.66
Lindblom questioned the classic model of policymaking because
he thought it relied upon unrealistic assumptions about our ability to
analyze complex issues.67 While it may appear to be a theoretically
rational approach, the classic model could never be applied to realworld, complex problems.68 Even if decisionmakers could identify the
myriad objectives and values to be considered, they would likely
disagree about their relative importance and find conflicts and
contradictions among them.69 Additionally, collecting and processing
every effect of every possibility would be a herculean and impossible

62
63

64

65
66
67
68

69

See supra text accompanying note 13.
Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 79, 81 (1959).
MICHAEL HOWLETT & M. RAMESH, STUDYING PUBLIC POLICY: POLICY CYCLES
AND POLICY SUBSYSTEMS 142 (1995).
Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 79.
Id.
Id. at 80.
Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
517, 519 (1979).
Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 81–82.
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undertaking.70 The classic model “assumes intellectual capacities and
sources of information” that we do not have.71 Lindblom recognized
that the classic model of decision-making is impossible in practice and
decreed that “every administrator faced with a sufficiently complex
problem must find ways drastically to simplify.”72
Under Lindblom’s theory, policymakers should institute policy in
an incremental fashion—by “muddling through” as best they can.73
Policy, according to Lindblom, “does not move in leaps and bounds,”
but instead it morphs and evolves “almost entirely through incremental
adjustments” being “made and re-made endlessly.”74
Lindblom discussed incremental policymaking both descriptively
and normatively. He asserted that it is actually how policy is
implemented in the real world.75 Incrementalism breaks down large
problems into more manageable tasks.76 It allows for gradual change
with less risk, and allows for decentralized control which results in
more grass-roots decision making over policy formation.77
Incrementalism “will be superior to any other decision-making method
available for complex problems in many circumstances, certainly
superior to a futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness.”78
The United States, given its pluralistic political and economic
makeup amongst the hodgepodge of its states, is a pure reflection of
the inevitability of Lindblom’s incrementalistic theory within a
democracy.79 Accordingly, it is regarded “as the standard—indeed
almost ubiquitous—mode of policy enactment in the United States.”80

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

80

Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, supra note 68, at 518.
Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 80.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 80–83; Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, supra note 68, at 517.
Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 84, 86.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 88.
Samuel Levey & James Hill, Universal Health Insurance: Incrementalism or
Comprehensive Reform?, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 189, 192 (1991).
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 9 (1984).
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B. Opposition to Incrementalism as a Path Forward
One argument that challenges the incrementalistic theory suggests
that some policy should be done in a wholesale fashion.81 Jennifer
Hochschild concluded that incrementalism was not an effective
approach to desegregating public schools in the aftermath of Brown.82
Rather than minimizing disruptions, building local support, and
gaining flexibility to monitor and adapt, the incremental approach
allowed for and even cultivated an opposition and resistance to
integration.83 Its muddling approach created a sense of uncertainty and
a lack of commitment, which in turn created resistance.84 Hochschild
found that opposing forces could derail the local segregation progress
if it was not implemented on the largest possible scale.85
Hochschild further argued that incremental efforts to desegregate
schools were more harmful than remaining with the status quo.86
“[H]alfhearted, restricted, timid” incremental changes caused racial
resentment, residential segregation, and decreased minority selfesteem and achievement.87 While an incrementalistic may view half
measures as better than no measures, Hochschild surmised that this
particular maxim may not have been true when it came to
desegregation.88
C. Examples of Incremental Policymaking
1. Marriage Equality
Marriage equality, which began at a point of illegality, has faced a
steeper and more challenging path than the process of literacy as a
fundamental right ever will.89 A complete history of legalized
81

82
83
84

85
86
87
88
89

For purposes of this article, wholesale change refers to a nationwide mandate
and incremental change concerns a state by state approach to adopting literacy
as a right.
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 80, at 11–12.
Id. at 46–48.
Id. at 46–54 (explaining districts that went through fast change had greater
success than those that took small steps over a longer period).
Id. at 54–70.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Juxtaposing the “starting points” of the two issues. Illegality of same sex
marriage in DOMA vs. a ‘social good’ is not necessarily a right.

2020

Now I Know My "ACBs"

309

persecution and discrimination faced by same-sex couples is beyond
the scope of this article, however a brief understanding of the how the
United States went from The Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)90 to
Obergefell v. Hodges is useful.91
One of the first steps towards the path to marriage equality taken in
the aftermath of DOMA was the Supreme Court of Vermont’s decision
in Baker v. State, which held that the exclusion of same-sex couples
from constitutional protection was illegal.92 The Baker Court, while
not granting any positive rights, declared that same-sex couples were
“entitled . . . to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by
Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples.”93 Following the Baker
Court’s suggestion that it lay within the “prerogatives of the
Legislature” to suitably remedy the problem,94 the Vermont
legislature, in 2000, passed the first-in-the-nation state law allowing
for civil unions for same-sex couples.95 After eight years of stateendorsed civil unions, however, the Vermont legislature’s Commission
on Family Recognition and Protection detailed significant disparities
and inequities in civil unions compared to marriage.96 In 2009, the
Marriage Equality Act became law and defined marriage as between
“two people” as opposed to between a man and a woman.97
Massachusetts took a different approach to the DOMA-reality. It
judicially recognized marriage equality in the courts, rather than the
legislature, in the case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.98
Unlike the court in Vermont, the Massachusetts Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court did not pass on the opportunity to create law
90

91
92
93
94
95

96

97
98

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (defining marriage for federal
purposes as between a man and a woman and permitting states to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages legally granted by other states), invalidated by
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
744 A.2d 864, 866 (Vt. 1999).
Id.
Id.
See Jill Jourdan, The Effects of Civil Unions on Vermont Children, 28 VT. B.J.
32, 32 (2002).
THE OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT COMMISSION
ON FAMILY RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION 26–27 (2008), http://www.leg.
state.vt.us/WorkGroups/FamilyCommission/VCFRP_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3NPD-VRLQ].
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West 2009).
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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defining marriage.99 The decision in Goodridge established marriage
as between “two persons” because “barring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because
that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution.”100 The decision in Goodridge, and its
implementation as law in 2004, made Massachusetts the first state to
recognize marriage equality.
Following Goodridge, the Massachusetts legislature proposed a
bill that would create civil unions for same sex couples that would
allow them to “obtain the legal protections, benefits, rights and
responsibilities associated with civil marriage, while preserving the
traditional, historic nature and meaning of the institution of civil
marriage.”101 The legislature submitted this bill to the Supreme
Judicial Court for an Advisory Opinion, fearing “grave doubt as to the
constitutionality” of whether marriage exclusively reserved for
opposite sex couples and a separate caste of relationship available for
same sex couples would pass muster.102 In its opinion, the court
soundly rejected the bill as unconstitutional.103 The court rejected the
legislature’s attempt to make civil unions equal to marriage,104 which
would have “relegate[d] same-sex couples to a different status.”105 To
the court, it was more than a “semantic” argument: “[t]he dissimilitude
between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous;
it is a considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable
assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class
status.”106 In the court’s opinion, a civil union, even if
indistinguishable from marriage, is decidedly unequal in the eyes of
the law because its status as separate makes it decidedly not equal.107

99
100
101

102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 969.
Id.
In re Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Mass. 2004)
(quoting An Act Relative to Civil Unions, S. No. 2175, § 1).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 569 (“The history of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom,
if ever, equal.”).
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Other states also wrestled with the distinction between civil unions
and marriage and the issues of definition and discrimination.108
Suzanne Goldberg found that some states’ justifications for a “separate
but equal”109 system of distinction were based on the history and
tradition of marriage being between a man and a woman.110 She
discussed Connecticut’s rationale as justifying “ongoing
discrimination” by relying on “past practices.”111 The states of New
Jersey and California similarly argued for keeping marriage between a
man and a woman based on a historical narrative.112
The Office of the Attorney General in Maryland researched the
state by state approach taken in regards to marriage equality in
2015.113 In the ten years since the decision in Goodridge, thirty-one
states had prohibited gay marriage, either by statute or constitutional
amendment.114 In the two years after the 2013 Windsor case held that
DOMA’s definition of marriage was unconstitutional as a deprivation
of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment,115 there
had been a recent “encouraging trend” of states recognizing same-sex

108

109
110
111

112

113

114

115

Suzanne B. Goldberg, Marriage as Monopoly: History, Tradition,
Incrementalism, and the Marriage/Civil Union Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1397, 1405 (2009).
Id. at 1399.
Id. at 1399–400.
Id. at 1404. See also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 414
(Conn. 2008) (“The [State] also maintained that . . . since ancient times,
marriage has been understood to be the union of a man and a woman, and . . .
‘deeply rooted in this [n]ation’s history and tradition . . . .’” (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))).
Goldberg, supra note 108, at 1404–05. “New Jersey defended its marriage law
in a similar way, ‘rest[ing] its case on age-old traditions, beliefs, and laws’ . . . .”
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 206 (N.J. 2006)). “California
likewise advanced the argument that . . . ‘the institution of marriage traditionally
(both in California and throughout most of the world) has been limited to a
union between a man and a woman.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384, 447–48 (Cal. 2008)).
MD. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE STATE OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN
AMERICA (2015). This is nineteen years after DOMA, twelve years after
Goodridge, and immediately preceding the Court’s decision in Obergefell.
Id. at 1. Twenty-three of those state prohibitions took place within three years of
the Goodridge decision. Id. at 8.
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–71, 775 (2013).
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marriage.116 In 2015, thirty-five states had recognized a right to
marriage for same-sex couples.117
This incremental trend toward equality resulted in a country that
“look[ed] more like a checkerboard than one ‘Nation, one people.’”118
The Maryland Report concluded that “[t]o ask families and children to
wait their turn until democratic majorities in their respective states
decide to recognize their inherent human dignity is simply to ask too
much.”119 In 2015, the Supreme Court held that the patchwork of
rights, due to “years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and the
discussions that attended these public acts, [that left] States . . . divided
on the issue of same-sex marriage” was not sustainable.120
In extending the right to marry to same-sex couples, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion used a four-prong approach of “principles and
traditions” to validate the decision—only three of which are relevant to
this discussion.121 First, the right is “inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy” and therefore provides an avenue for other
“freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”122
Secondly, the right “safeguards children” by preventing them from
feeling “the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser”
through “harm and humiliat[ion].”123 Finally, the right “is a keystone
of [the nation’s] social order.124 Throughout history, marriage has been
“the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress”125 and “a great public
institution, giving character to our whole civil polity”126 that
116
117

118

119
120
121

122
123
124
125
126

MD. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 113, at 3.
Id. Of the thirty-five, only eleven were done by statute and twenty-four had to be
mandated by the courts. Id.
Id. at 20 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 868 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 21.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
Id. at 2599. The second of Justice Kennedy’s principles, justifying the right to
marry “because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance
to the committed individuals,” is not directly relevant to this discussion. Id. His
other three principles can be better related to the topic of literacy as a
fundamental right.
Id.
Id. at 2600–601.
Id. at 2601.
Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
Id. (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 213).
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“nourish[es] the union.”127 Putting such an emphasis on the “right by
placing [it] at the center of so many facets of the legal and social
order,” Justice Kennedy concluded that the states themselves had
bestowed upon it a “fundamental character” which cannot then be
denied to its citizens.128
The incremental path taken by marriage equality has been studied
and written about extensively.129 The research conducted by Kees
Waaldijk, William N. Eskridge, and Yuval Merin on the “theory of
small change”130 thoroughly examines the “evolutionary staircase with
relatively specific steps” that has culminated in a national recognition
of marriage equality for same-sex couples.131 Their phased approach
reflects a three-step, incremental approach to marriage equality: “(1)
the decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy occurs first; (2)
then anti-discrimination against sexual minorities is furthered; and (3)
lastly, the relationships of same-sex couples are then legally
recognized.”132 This incremental approach thrust the issue into the
national spotlight. Yet by first normalizing the subject at the state
level, “a great change” was prevented at the outset on the federal level,
which “show[ed] the public that their fears about same-sex partnership
and its potential negative effects on society [were] groundless.”133
While there is still work to be done to guarantee lasting marriage
equality rights, the incremental theory does provide a “helpful guide”
to show how marriage equality grew from illegal, to a patch-work of
legality, to normative action at the federal level.134
127
128
129

130

131
132
133
134

Id.
Id. at 2601.
See generally Goldberg, supra note 108, at 1422–23 (attacking state invocation
of incrementalism to justify the slow redressing of inequality); Jeremiah A. Ho,
Weather Permitting: Incrementalism, Animus, and the Art of Forecasting
Marriage Equality After U.S. v. Windsor, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2014) (tracing
the incremental steps that softened regulations as applicable to sexual minorities
particularly given the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor) [hereinafter Ho,
Weather Permitting].
Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105,
107 (2010).
Ho, Weather Permitting, supra note 129, at 7.
Id.
Aloni, supra note 130, at 107–08.
Ho, Weather Permitting, supra note 129, at 10; see also Jeremiah A. Ho, Once
We’re Done Honeymooning: Obergefell v. Hodges, Incrementalism, and
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2. Marijuana Legalization
Another example of subject matter being thrust into the national
spotlight through an incremental state-by-state approach is that of the
legalization of marijuana.135 This ongoing issue, while less settled than
that of same-sex marriage, is nonetheless relevant to the discussion
here. Specifically, its path from illegality to state-by-state forms of
legality to the forecast of a potential legal national acceptance.136
Federally, cannabis has been classified as a Schedule I drug since
the passage of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) in 1970.137 The
CSA made it illegal to grow, buy, or use marijuana (in any form), with
no exception for medical use.138 From 1970-2009 there was little
movement at the federal level concerning marijuana.139 In 2009, the
Ogden Memo was released, softening the federal priority of
enforcement and policing as it related to state laws regulating medical
marijuana.140 In 2014, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment prohibited
the Justice Department from interfering with the implementation of
state medical cannabis laws.141 Congress is currently debating

135

136

137

138
139
140

141

Advances for Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination, 104 KY. L.J. 207, 212
(2015).
See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 100–02 (2015). This Note is not intended to
be an in-depth analysis of marijuana laws. For simplicity’s sake, this Note will
be using “marijuana” and “cannabis” interchangeably.
Similar to the previous analysis of marriage equality, this Note is simply
providing an annotated history of a longer journey.
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1249
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c)(c)(10) (2018)).
21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1), 812(c)(c)(10) (2018).
See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 84–87.
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice,
to
selected
U.S.
Attorneys
(Oct.
19,
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-stateattorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states
[https://perma.cc/G6ATMRZE]. The new policy directed federal prosecutors to “not focus federal
resources in [their] States on individuals whose actions are in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use
of marijuana.” Id.
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-235,
§ 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014) (“None of the funds made available in this Act to
the Department of Justice may be used . . . to prevent such States from
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution,
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”).
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removing marijuana from the list of illicit substances enumerated in
the CSA.142
State-level response to the federal ban of marijuana in the CSA has
varied, ranging from legal medical uses to decriminalization to
recreational legalization.143 Beginning in 1996, states began to create
their own policies for regulating marijuana, with California voters
approving a state-wide referendum legalizing its use for medical
purposes.144 In 2009, the year that the Ogden Memo was released,
thirteen states allowed some form of legalized medical marijuana
use.145 Today, more than half of the states and the District of Columbia
have legalized medical marijuana, and eleven states and the District of
Columbia have passed laws permitting its recreational use, with
potentially more to come this year.146
This slow burn to national legitimacy has created tremendous
disparity in the enforcement of criminal, banking, and tax law, as well
as in the expenditure of public resources compared to other crimes.147
The conflict between the states and the federal law “despite the DOJ’s
announced
enforcement
leniency . . . .
significantly
hampers . . . [b]anks, attorneys, insurance companies, potential
investors, and others—justifiably concerned about breaking federal
law . . . .”148 Federally regulated banks are hesitant to do business with
142

143

144

145
146

147
148

Tom Angell, Vote to Federally Legalize Marijuana Planned in Congress,
FORBES
(Nov.
16,
2019,
7:38
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2019/11/16/vote-to-federally-legalizemarijuana-planned-in-congress/#7b3deb78201b [https://perma.cc/3FP2-WR4N].
Susan F. Mandiberg, A Hybrid Approach to Marijuana Federalism, 23 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 823, 824 (2019).
The Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5
(West 1996).
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 85–86.
See German Lopez, You Can Now Legally Buy Marijuana in Illinois, VOX (Jan.
2, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/2/
21046592/illinois-marijuana-legalization-recreational-sales
[https://perma.cc/
5G6N-TU9D] (highlighting the commencement of Illinois’ recreational
marijuana sales in 2020); Audrey McNamara, These States Now Have Legal
Weed, and Which States Could Follow Suit in 2020, CBS NEWS (Jan. 1, 2020,
3:55 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/where-is-marijuana-legal-in-2020illinois-joins-10-other-states-legalizing-recreational-pot-2020-01-01/
[https://perma.cc/8EU4-TWXB] (illustrating the “piecemeal” fashion in which
states have adopted marijuana legalization and projected additions in 2020).
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 91–94.
Id. at 79. See also Carolyn Enciso Sieve, Clarity for Employers in the Haze of
Marijuana Legislation, 61 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 40, 41–42 (2019) (examining
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state-legitimized marijuana businesses for fear of federal
prosecution.149 Federal tax law makes it “disadvantageous” to run a
legitimate business if it violates federal drug law.150
The issues raised due to the current disparate nature of the
marijuana situation have perhaps come to an unsustainable head.151 It
can be argued that the theory of incrementalism, as it pertains to the
national legalization of marijuana, is working.152 “Today, the states
that have legalized marijuana are conducting a once-in-a-generation
pressure test on the bounds of democratic experimentation permitted
within our constitutional structure.”153 There are different states with
different laws, some of which are in compliance with federal law and
some of which are not.154 The state-driven drive to legalization has
made this a national concern while its local roots have resulted in a
feeling by Americans that the issue is already moot.155 “Marijuana
legalization
is
very
popular
nationwide . . . .
That’s
emboldening . . . lawmakers to take the issue far more seriously than in
years past.”156 By breaking the national problem into state issues,
allowing states to experiment (to see what works and what does not),
and by giving local governments control of a traditionally local issue,

149
150
151
152

153

154

155

156

the tightrope that employers and employees may have to walk, balancing
disparate federal and state regulations).
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 91.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 90–91.
See generally Mandiberg, supra note 143, at 826 (arguing that a “one-size-fitsall” approach is ill-suited for marijuana legalization).
Brian M. Blumenfeld, State Legalization of Marijuana and Our American
System of Federalism: A Historio-Constitutional Primer, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 77, 96 (2017).
See id. at 79; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 90; Mandiberg, supra note
143, at 825–26.
See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 122 n.177 (citing evidence that a
growing majority of Americans are in favor of legalizing marijuana).
German Lopez, Marijuana Legalization is About to Have a Huge Year, VOX
(Jan. 23, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/
1/23/21076978/marijuana-legalization-2020-ballot-initiatives
[https://perma.cc/KW36-XU24] [hereinafter Lopez, Marijuana Legalization].
See also McNamara, These States Now Have Legal Weed, supra note 146
(“[S]upport for legal pot hit a new high in 2019, with 65% of U.S. adults saying
marijuana should be legal.”).
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the legalization of marijuana has forced the issue into the national
spotlight where it must be dealt with.157
III. AN INCREMENTAL PATH FOR LITERACY
A. Rejection from the Courts Is a Blessing
In the 1982 case of Plyler v. Doe, the Court found that a Texas law
unconstitutionally withheld funds for the education of undocumented
immigrant children.158 The Court determined that the law’s restriction
on the opportunity to receive an education violated the right to equal
protection.159 While the Court fell short of declaring education a
“fundamental right,” it emphasized its importance.160 Additionally, the
Court spoke to the importance of literacy and its benefits:
Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write
will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and
every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the
social economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the
individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement,
make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a
status-based denial of basic education with the framework of
equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.161

In Rodriguez, the Court appeared to reverse the course it had set
with cases like Brown and Plyler when it held that a policy of school
funding which unequally distributed resources and thereby affected the
quality of education did not require strict scrutiny as there is no
fundamental right to a well-financed education.162 In 1986, the Court
reaffirmed the prior position it took in Rodriguez, “that education ‘is
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution.’”163
157

158
159
160
161
162
163

See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 84–90; Mandiberg, supra note 143, at
838–39.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222–23 (1982).
Id. at 224–25.
Id. at 221–24.
Id. at 222.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973).
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
35). In Papasan, lands held in trust by the state were not being used for public
schools, as was directed when the lands were granted to the state by the federal
government. Id. at 274. Petitioners claimed that they were being denied an
adequate education based on the state’s disproportionate distribution of state
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Although the Court in Rodriguez and Papasan did not recognize
education as a fundamental right, it did acknowledge that there may be
“some identifiable quantum of education [that] is a constitutionally
protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [other]
right[s] . . . .”164 Since the plaintiffs in Rodriguez and Papasan did not
identify a failure to attain a specific “quantum of education” connected
to the exercise of other constitutional rights, “no charge fairly could be
made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimum skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.”165
B. The Status of the States
Every state constitution includes at least one provision requiring
the state to establish and support some type of public education
system.166 Some contain several provisions concerning the
establishment, administration, and funding of public schools; these
state constitutional education provisions reflect different commitments
about how to provide educational services.167 The language used by
each state could dictate how easy it would be to establish a right to
literacy within the respective state.168 Some constitutions require a
state to provide a “[g]eneral and uniform” education, others mandate

164
165

166

167
168

resources. Id. While distinguishing from the facts in Rodriguez and clarifying its
meaning—that not all disparate school funding was legal—the Court reaffirmed
the application of a rational basis standard of review. Id. at 286–88.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36.
Id. at 36–37; see also Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286 (“The petitioners do not allege
that schoolchildren . . . are not taught to read or write; they do not allege that
they receive no instruction on even the educational basics; they allege no actual
facts in support of their assertion that they have been deprived of a minimally
adequate education [for the exercise of other constitutional rights].”).
MOLLY A. HUNTER, EDUC. JUSTICE, STATE CONSTITUTION EDUCATION CLAUSE
LANGUAGE
(2011),
https://edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/State%20Constitution%20Education%2
0Clause%20Language.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY97-QM84]; EMILY PARKER,
EDUC. COMM’N, OF THE STATES, CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR PUBLIC
EDUCATION: 50-STATE REVIEW 1 (2016), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M5XQ-LCGN].
See Thro, supra note 27, at 1639; PARKER, supra note 166, at 1–2.
See PARKER, supra note 166, at 5–22.
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that the education be “thorough and efficient.”169 Perhaps the states
with language in their constitutions that envision “education as a
democratic imperative” would be those most likely, either through
their courts or legislatures, to implement literacy as a fundamental
right.170
C. Moving Forward by Taking Small Steps
The incremental theory posits that most policy changes are likely
to be small before any large change in policy can or will be realized.171
This Note has demonstrated that the path to marriage equality and
legalized marijuana has not been one nationally-sweeping change, but
rather changes made state-by-state, until eventually change was
realized in the larger system.172 Analogously, a similar path could, and
should, be considered in the fight for literacy as a fundamental right.
Rather than a national policy, where concerns of over-reaching can
drag a debate into a quagmire, the incremental model makes more
sense by allowing progress toward the ultimate goal:
The incremental model views decision-making as a practical
exercise concerned with solving problems at hand rather than
achieving lofty goals. In this model the means chosen for solving
problems are discovered through trial-and-error rather than through
the comprehensive evaluation of all possible means. Decisionmakers consider only a few familiar alternatives for
appropriateness and stop the search when they believe an
acceptable alternative has been found.173

Like the roads which led to marriage equality and marijuana
legalization, a right to literacy must take small steps to ensure its
foundation is secure before rising to the national level.174 First, any
change must be small; there cannot be a major sea-change all at

169
170

171
172
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HUNTER, supra note 166.
Id. (The report cites the following states: AR, CA, FL, IL, IN, ME, MA, MI,
MN, MO, MT, NH, NC, ND, RI, SD, TN, TX).
Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 81, 85.
See Ho, Weather Permitting, supra note 129, at 10–11; Mandiberg, supra note
143, at 849.
HOWLETT & RAMESH, supra note 64, at 142.
Cf. Ho, Weather Permitting, supra note 129, at 7 (using a phased approach,
similar to that expressed in the works of Waaldijk, Eskridge, and Merin, to
formulate a successful path for same-sex couples).
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once.175 Fortunately, there is already some duty of education owed by
the states to their citizens and national standards of education, so
adding a right to literacy would not be a dramatic shift from the status
quo, both on the state and federal levels.176 Specifically, the standard
set by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court could be viewed as
simply a semantic degree of change from demanding a right to literacy
in the Commonwealth:
The Commonwealth’s duty requires the Commonwealth to have a
State public education plan to ensure that our children are educated
in a manner so that they possess capabilities that “accord with our
Constitution’s emphasis on educating our children to become free
citizens on whom the Commonwealth may rely” to ensure the
functioning of our democracy and society.177

It is also worthy to note that the authors of the Massachusetts
Constitution were aware that changes may become necessary and
included a mandate to evolve, so if something like literacy became a
fundamental necessity, it could be mandated.178 If Massachusetts were
to adopt a right to literacy, it would certainly pass Lindblom’s
requirement of keeping the change small.179
Second, normalizing literacy among the states would allow for
local control and formation before rolling it out on a national level.180
Adoption at the local level may “communicate to the federal
government that the [policy] is not only workable but also
beneficial . . . . Local initiatives . . . can offer potential benefits to the
federal government in the form of direct evidence of both public
opinion and the utility of [policies] not yet entered into law at the
federal level.”181 If municipalities or states adopted a right to literacy,
175
176
177

178

179
180
181

See Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 86.
See PARKER, supra note 166; supra text accompanying note 13.
Doe v. Sec’y of Educ., 95 N.E.3d 241, 253 n.23 (Mass. 2018) (quoting McDuffy
v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993)).
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2. “[I]t shall be the duty of legislatures and
magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests
of literature . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). See also Doe, 95 N.E.3d at 253 n.23
(“Significantly, the capabilities considered to be essential ‘necessarily will
evolve together with our society.’” (quoting McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555)).
See Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 86.
See id. at 85–86.
Shanna Singh, Brandeis’s Happy Incident Revisited: U.S. Cities as the New
Laboratories of International Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 537, 552–53
(2005) (explaining the hypothetical impact that local policy can have on framing
larger discussions).

2020

Now I Know My "ACBs"

321

the potential benefits of increased civic engagement and the failures of
additional lawsuits or a lack of progress in literacy rates would be
more apparent and easier to fix.182 This will minimize the risk of
failure at the national level because of incrementalism’s ability to fail
on a small scale limits its exposure in the grand scheme.183
Finally, a gradual adoption by the states will allow its fundamental
character184 to become normalized within the national
consciousness.185 Similar to the decision in Obergefell, where the
Court held that where the states had bestowed such importance on the
fundamental nature of marriage that it could not be denied to certain
classes, literacy is so important that its fundamental character must be
recognized as a basic right for everyone.186 While it is unclear if a
fundamental right to literacy has popular support, “[f]ew would deny
the importance of literacy in this society or the advantages enjoyed by
those with advanced skills.”187 And like marijuana legalization,
literacy’s popular support is essential for its success in the incremental
model.188
The incremental model provides an explanation as to how state-bystate acceptance, local restrictions and all, would be the best approach
to put literacy on the national stage.189
182
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Cf. id.; Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 85–
86.
Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 85–86.
Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). This discussion’s
analogue would be that, similar to marriage, literacy promotes other
fundamental rights, it is vital to an individual’s autonomy, illiteracy promotes a
feeling of less-than, and a literate society is key to a functioning democratic
society.
See Aloni, supra note 130, at 161. For instances where the Supreme Court has
deferred to national norms, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003)
(striking down anti-sodomy laws because “[o]ver the course of the last decades,
States with same-sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing them”); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–16 (2002) (finding that a “large number of States
prohibiting the execution of [intellectually disabled] persons . . . .” was
justification to prohibit the practice nationally).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL., ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA: A FIRST LOOK AT THE
FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY 1 (2002),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93275.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PUZ-RJ4U].
Lopez, Marijuana Legalization, supra note 156; accord Aloni, supra note 130,
at 115.
E.g., HOWLETT & RAMESH, supra note 64, at 142.
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NEXT TIME WON’T YOU SING WITH ME
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”190 While Justice Brandeis was not referring to
incrementalism specifically, his federalist mantra has parallels in the
theory. Literacy is undoubtedly a fundamental requirement for both the
citizens and the nation. The historical evidence, after examining the
importance that literacy plays in our society, is undeniable.191 The
Court and Congress may have come close, but “close only counts in
horseshoes and hand grenades.” The theory of incrementalism, as seen
through example, offers a viable method to propel literacy as a
fundamental right into the national zeitgeist—evolving from an idea
into a patchwork of state laws that culminates in a national policy.
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New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
See generally ABRAHAM BLINDERMAN, THREE EARLY CHAMPIONS OF
EDUCATION: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN RUSH, AND NOAH WEBSTER 10–
11 (1976); John E. Haubenreich, Education and the Constitution, 87 PEABODY J.
EDUC. 436, 439 (2012).

